## IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA STATESBORO DIVISION

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Plaintiff,

V.

**CIVIL ACTION NO.: CV612-100** 

STANLY WILLIAMS, Warden,

Defendant.

## **MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION**

Plaintiff, an inmate currently confined at Georgia State Prison in Reidsville, Georgia, filed an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 contesting certain conditions of his confinement while he was housed at Smith State Prison in Glennville, Georgia. A prisoner proceeding in a civil action against officers or employees of government entities must comply with the mandates of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 & 1915A. In determining compliance, the court shall be guided by the longstanding principle that *pro se* pleadings are entitled to liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Walker v. Dugger, 860 F.2d 1010, 1011 (11th Cir. 1988).

28 U.S.C. § 1915A requires a district court to screen the complaint for cognizable claims before or as soon as possible after docketing. The court must dismiss the complaint or any portion of the complaint that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary damages from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and (2).

In <u>Mitchell v. Farcass</u>, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997), the Eleventh Circuit interpreted the language contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), which is nearly identical to that contained in the screening provisions at § 1915A(b). As the language of § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) closely tracks the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court held that the same standards for determining whether to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) should be applied to prisoner complaints filed pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). <u>Mitchell</u>, 112 F.3d at 1490. While the court in <u>Mitchell</u> interpreted § 1915(e), its interpretation guides this Court in applying the identical language of § 1915A.

Plaintiff contends that two (2) officers escorted him out of the lockdown recreation yard without handcuffs when another inmate "popped out of his cell" and assaulted him. (Doc. No. 1, p. 5). Plaintiff names, Stanley Williams, the warden at Smith State Prison, as the Defendant.

Plaintiff makes no factual allegations in his Complaint against Defendant Williams. A plaintiff must set forth "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief." FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). As Plaintiff has failed to make any factual allegations against Defendant Williams, his claim against Defendant Williams should be dismissed.

Additionally, it appears Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendant Williams liable based solely on his position as a supervisor, which he cannot do in a section 1983 action. In section 1983 actions, liability must be based on something more than a theory of respondeat superior. Braddy v. Fla. Dep't of Labor & Employment Sec., 133 F.3d 797, 801 (11th Cir. 1998). A supervisor may be liable only through personal participation in

the alleged constitutional violation or when there is a causal connection between the supervisor's conduct and the alleged violations. <u>Id.</u> at 802. As Plaintiff fails to make specific allegations against Defendant Williams, Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Williams should be dismissed for this reason, as well.

Moreover, the Eighth Amendment imposes duties on prison officials such as the duty to take reasonable measures to ensure the safety of inmates. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994). This right to safety is violated when prison officials show a deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm. Carter v. Galloway, 352 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828). In order to sustain such a claim, the plaintiff must establish the following: (1) there was a substantial risk of serious harm to him; (2) officials showed a deliberate indifference to this risk; and (3) there is a causal connection between the officials' acts or omissions and the alleged constitutional deprivation. Id. As Plaintiff fails to make any assertion that officials knew of a substantial risk of harm and ignored that risk, Plaintiff cannot sustain a cause of action against Defendant Williams.

## CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, it is my RECOMMENDATION that Plaintiff's Complaint be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

AMES E. GRAHAM

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE